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predictions are minimal sets that are closed under “the same or better reply”
operations. Under additional assumptions in each case, the prediction boils
down to pure Nash equilibria, pure ex-post equilibria or pure minimax regret
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1 Introduction
The standard analysis of games with incomplete information relies on the notion of
Bayesian equilibrium, and has led to important theoretical constructions. Moreover,
equilibrium insights can sometimes be applied with success to real-world problems.
However, the use of equilibrium also has important limitations, as it assumes the
existence of a common-knowledge type space to describe the underlying uncertainty.
When for instance one talks to game theorists that have provided advice on how
to bid in real auctions, this is often a major stumbling block: we may calculate
an equilibrium of the given auction, but in the absence of common-knowledge of
strategies, type spaces and prior beliefs, it is implausible to expect the equilibrium
to be played. How should one bid then? More generally, how does a player behave in
a game of incomplete information? Our analysis provides several possible answers,
which should be treated as a guide to behavior in our benchmarks.
In agreement with recent trends in the robust analysis of game theory with in-
complete information, we shall deemphasize the role of beliefs and turn to ex-post
considerations. In fact, we shall propose an alternative paradigm to equilibrium
theory by going all the way to the other extreme: without specifying any prior dis-
tribution, we shall analyze a learning model of behavior based on ex-post regrets.
We apply our ex-post regret learning process to games in which each player knows
his or her own payoﬀ function. This makes our results applicable to private-values
incomplete-information games. The analysis will be performed both under ﬁxed
matching and random matching of the players. We assume large multiple popula-
tions –one for each type of each player–, from which players are drawn to play the
game.
Under ﬁxed matching, a player is selected from each population and that set of
players stays matched to play the game inﬁnitely often. In the simplest version of
the ex-post regret learning Markov process, each player starts by choosing his or
her ﬁrst action arbitrarily. After that ﬁrst period, his or her last action is repeated
with positive probability (inertia), but the player also switches to other actions with
positive probability if and only if he or she regrets not having used them in the
last period. That is, the player compares the payoﬀ obtained in the last period and
wonders what would have happened, ceteris paribus, had he or she used a diﬀerent
action.1 The player feels regret for not having used those actions that would have
1See Saran and Serrano (2010) for an extension of the analysis to regret matching with respect
to any ﬁnite memory, as opposed to only one-period memory, studied here.
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strictly increased his or her last period’s payoﬀ, and switches to playing them with
arbitrary positive probability. This means that, at any given period, a player’s action
is either unchanged or modiﬁed into one that constitutes a strictly better reply to
the last action proﬁle.
In general ﬁnite games in normal form, we show that the recurrent classes of our
ﬁnite Markov process correspond to minimal sets of actions that are closed under
“the same or better reply” (minimal CUSOBR sets). These sets are related to the
minimal product sets that are “closed under weakly better replies” of Ritzberger and
Weibull (1995). Any of the Ritzberger-Weibull closed sets contains one CUSOBR
set, sometimes properly, since the “(weakly) better-reply” correspondence contains
the “same or (strictly) better-reply” correspondence. However, we ﬁnd that some
minimal CUSOBR sets are not necessarily product sets, and sometimes they need
not be included in any closed set a` la Ritzberger and Weibull.2
For weakly acyclic games under better replies, the result is stronger. All the
recurrent classes of the ex-post regret learning process are singletons, and the set
of absorbing states coincides with the set of pure Nash equilibria of the complete-
information game corresponding to the private valuations of the players that have
been matched. Thus, in spite of the initial incomplete information, the set of players,
through the experience developed by repeatedly playing the game together, arrive
at Nash equilibrium play. The process converges with probability 1 to one of the
pure Nash equilibria; which of them is selected will depend on the initial condition.
Throughout the paper we use three running examples to illustrate our results, the
second-price auction, the ﬁrst-price auction and Bertrand duopoly competition. We
show that all three are weakly acyclic games under better replies.
Under random matching, an independent draw from each player’s population
takes place every period. The selected players play for one period and then return to
the pool. We conceive a game of incomplete information associated with the random
matching model. A strategy for a player in this game is a function specifying for each
type of that payer, the distribution of actions amongst the corresponding population.
For each ex-post realization of the types, each player’s payoﬀ is a function of the
strategies used in the associated populations. For a given player, two strategies are
adjacent if exactly one type of that player has switched his or her action, while all
other types have not, in the two strategies in question. The set of states of this
Markov process is now the set of strategy proﬁles.
2Sets that are closed under weakly better replies are curb (closed under rational behavior) sets.
CUSOBR sets are not, as some better replies are excluded.
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The recurrent classes of the ex-post regret learning process with random matching
coincide with those minimal sets of strategy proﬁles that are “closed under the same
or adjacent ex-post better replies” (minimal CUSOAEBR sets) of the incomplete
information game described. For any strategy proﬁle, the “same or adjacent ex-post
better reply” correspondence consists of the same strategy proﬁle –in which no player
has changed his or her action– and those adjacent strategy proﬁles that are obtained
when in some ex-post event, some types of the players switch to (strictly) better
replies.
Once again, for games that are weakly acyclic with respect to adjacent ex-post
better replies, the result is stronger. All recurrent classes are singletons and each
absorbing state of the dynamics corresponds to a pure ex-post equilibrium of the
incomplete information game. Some games, like the second-price auction, are weakly
acyclic in this sense, but most games are not. Essentially the condition of weak
acyclicity amounts to the existence of ex-post equilibrium, quite demanding in general
games.
Moreover, in general games, the minimal CUSOAEBR sets can be rather large.
We illustrate this by exhibiting the unique minimal CUSOAEBR sets for the ﬁrst-
price auction and Bertrand duopoly game. Almost every strategy proﬁle is part
of such a minimal set, which is therefore uninformative in terms of an economic
prediction. In an attempt to gain determinacy, we turn to stochastic monotone
dynamics by allowing players to “make mistakes” with small probability, and where
the probability of switching to an action is an increasing function of the associated
regret. Taking limits as mistakes probability vanishes would not help, however, since
the problem is the large recurrent class of the unperturbed process, as just described.
Instead, we propose an approach in which taking another limit is possible and
yields an interesting answer. We take the limit as the switch probabilities vanish.3
If one performs such a limiting exercise, one obtains a selection of the “recurrent
classes” of the associated “unperturbed process,” which happens to be a snapshot of
the game in which the behavior of all agents is ﬁxed, and hence the set of “recurrent
classes” simply coincides with the set of states of the process. Thus, the exercise
performed in this part of the paper is the long-run prediction in a random match-
ing context in which the behavioral rule is the perturbed monotone ex-post regret
learning, but where switches are unlikely events. Such an application of stochastic
stability provides an extremely powerful reﬁnement in these cases.4 For the ﬁrst-price
3These results are robust to small non-negligible probabilities, as conﬁrmed via simulations.
4We also introduce a test to check for stochastic stability, of interest in its own right, based on
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auction and Bertrand duopoly, a unique strategy proﬁle is selected. In the ﬁrst-price
auction, each bidder bids half his valuation. In Bertrand duopoly, each ﬁrm uses
that price that, if it were the only ﬁrm in the market, would yield half the monopoly
proﬁt. In both cases, these actions are such that the maximum gain from increas-
ing the bid/price equates the maximum gain from decreasing it. It follows that the
strategy proﬁles selected by stochastic stability are minimax regret equilibria (Hyaﬁl
and Boutilier (2004)).5 Our learning foundation of minimax regret equilibria in the
ﬁrst-price auction and Bertrand duopoly game is a consequence of the inverse of
the regrets being the exponents of the switch probabilities, which go to zero in the
stochastic stability analysis. We view this as a valid economic prediction in the ab-
sence of information about the exact distribution of types in the population; Savage
(1951) was the ﬁrst to propose minimizing the maximum ex-post regret – minimax
regret – as a decision-making criterion in problems in which the agent has no speciﬁc
prior about the probabilities of the states of the world.
For each version of the model, our study yields the relevant sets that are closed
under the “same or better reply” as long-run predictions. Under stronger assump-
tions, play ends up at pure Nash equilibria of the corresponding complete informa-
tion game (ﬁxed matching in weakly acyclic games), pure ex-post equilibria (random
matching in weakly acyclic games) and minimax regret equilibria (random matching
and unlikely switches when there is no ex-post equilibrium). With respect to the
exogenous uncertainty stemming from type spaces, these three paradigms are belief-
independent and provide answers to how the game could be played, which ought to
be compared to its Bayesian equilibria.6
1.1 Related Literature
Our processes are part of the no-regret learning literature (see Fudenberg and Levine
(1998), Hart (2005) and Sandholm (2009) for diﬀerent surveys of the area; see also
Saran and Serrano (2010) and the references therein). However, our emphasis in
the current paper concerns games of incomplete information. As just stated, Sav-
the construction of certain weighted cycles. This is especially useful in systems like ours, where the
construction of minimal cost rooted trees would require to know the transitions between any pair
of states.
5At a minimax regret equilibrium, each player uses a strategy that minimizes his or her maximum
ex-post regret. Therefore, ex-post equilibria are always minimax regret equilibria (because players
have no regrets), but the latter set is generally non-empty.
6For the reasons outlined above, more research on dynamics and learning processes applied to
Bayesian games would be desirable (see Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2004) and Ely and Sandholm
(2005) for early contributions).
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age (1951) was the seminal contribution suggesting minimax regret as a decision
rule in contexts in which agents have no prior beliefs. Noting that Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium does not oﬀer any guidance to behavior when the players lack common
knowledge of priors, Linhart and Radner (1989) study minimax-regret strategies in
1
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-double auctions. Hyaﬁl and Boutilier (2004) deﬁne the minimax-regret equilibrium
for such environments.
Especially related to our ﬁxed-matching model is Hon-Snir, Monderer and Sela
(1998), who model learning in an auction context diﬀerently. The bidders’ valuations
are determined ﬁrst. Then, this ﬁxed set of players repeatedly plays a ﬁrst-price
auction. Players are informed about the proﬁle of bids at the end of each auction. The
paper looks at two learning rules: generalized ﬁctitious play and adaptive learning
with bounded recall. The main result is that, if all players use either learning rule,
then per-period play converges to Nash equilibrium of the one-shot auction in which
players’ types are common knowledge.7
Our last results use stochastic stability. Most applications of this methodology
in non-cooperative game theory have been conﬁned to games with complete infor-
mation.8 An exception is Jensen, Sloth and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), which extends
the perturbed best-response model in Young (1993) to ﬁnite Bayesian games.9 Com-
pared to our analysis, their players possess much more information, both ex-ante and
ex-post.
1.2 Plan of the Paper
Section 2 describes the ex-post regret learning rule. Section 3 studies it under ﬁxed
matching, and Section 4 under random matching. Each of these two sections con-
tains a subsection on weakly acyclic games that shows the stronger results. Section
4 contains also a subsection that deals with stochastic stability analysis. The ap-
7The particular equilibrium is the one in which the player with the highest valuation wins and
pays a price equal to the second-highest valuation. However, this happens because of their a priori
assumption that no player bids more than her valuation. We would also get a similar result with
this additional assumption.
8See Young (1998) for an account of diﬀerent applications.
9They make three assumptions that are necessary for this extension. First, the players know
the true distribution of types in the population; second, the types of the matched players are
truthfully revealed to everyone at the end of the interaction; and third, for each type of each player,
there is a record of the action taken by that type during some past periods in which that type
was selected. Under these assumptions, the unperturbed best-response dynamics, appropriately
redeﬁned, converges with probability one to some convention, which is a state that is “equivalent”
to a strict Bayesian equilibrium of the game – if the latter exists. The perturbations then select
among the diﬀerent strict Bayesian equilibria.
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plications to second-price auctions, ﬁrst-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies are
brought up to illustrate the relevant results in each case. Section 5 concludes, and
Section 6 collects the proofs of the major results.
2 Ex-Post Regret Learning
Consider a N -person game of incomplete information G, with a ﬁnite set of types Vi
and a ﬁnite set of actions Ai for each player who plays in position i ∈ N (we use N
for both the set and number of positions). There is a large population of players Pi
for each position i ∈ N (we will also use i to denote a player who plays in position
i). We assume private values, and for the most part we use the word “valuation”
(or “cost” depending on the application) instead of type. For each i ∈ N and each
vi ∈ Vi, there exists a nonempty subset of players Pvi ⊆ Pi whose valuations equal
vi. A player’s valuation is her private information, it is drawn once and for all, and
remains constant over time. A player’s type here involves no beliefs. The question
we tackle is how the players behave under this severe informational restriction.
Players’ interactions will take place under two distinct matching assumptions:
ﬁxed matching and random matching:
• Fixed Matching. For each position, a single player is selected randomly
and independently from the corresponding population of players. The selected
players are matched once and for all, and they repeatedly play the game every
period.
• Random Matching. In each period, a new set of players is selected randomly
and independently, one for each position from the corresponding population of
players, and matched to play the game. After they have played the game, the
matched players return to their respective populations. The process restarts in
the next period with a new selection and matching.
Each player in population Pi is identiﬁed by her valuation vi and her unique
action ai that she plays in the event she is matched. We shall assume that players
adapt their actions from one period to the next using the following ex-post regret
learning rule: suppose in period t a player with valuation vi is choosing action ai.
• If this player is not matched in period t, then she does not change her action
in period t + 1.
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• If this player is matched in period t, then let πi(vi, ai, a−i) be her ex-post payoﬀ
in period t’s game, where a−i is the proﬁle of actions of all other players in that
game. Pick any a′i ∈ Ai \ {ai}. Had she chosen a
′
i instead of ai in that game,
ceteris paribus, her payoﬀ would have been πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i).
10
Deﬁne Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i) = πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i)− πi(vi, ai, a−i).
If Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i) > 0, then we refer to this number as valuation vi’s ex-post
regret from using ai instead of a
′
i against a−i. In this case, letting q(·) ∈ (0, 1)
as a basic switch probability function, we assume that the player changes her
action to a′i in period t + 1 with probability q(Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i)) > 0 if and
only if Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i) > 0, and she does not switch her action with a positive
probability, i.e.,
∑
a′i
q(Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i)) < 1.
All these events entailing switches in actions are independent across players
and time.
This learning dynamics satisﬁes two properties: (i) inertia, i.e., a matched player
does not switch her action with a positive probability, and (ii) a matched player of
valuation vi switches to a
′
i in period t + 1 with a positive probability whenever her
ex-post regret from not using that action is positive. Several diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of q(·) fulﬁll these properties;11 in our analysis, we of course ﬁx q(·) to be one such
function.
Our concern in the next sections is the identiﬁcation of the long-run behavior un-
der ﬁxed and random matching of the players who follow the ex-post regret learning
rule. The dynamic process under ﬁxed matching [MFM/G(q)] is deﬁned over states
that are proﬁles of actions taken by the ﬁxed set of players. The dynamic process
under random matching [MRM/G(q)] is deﬁned over states that specify the distri-
butions of actions in the diﬀerent populations of players. Both are ﬁnite Markov
processes, and they are generally not irreducible, but they are still aperiodic, and
convergence always obtains to one of their recurrent classes.12 We shall therefore
state our results in terms of the recurrent classes of the dynamics MFM/G(q) and
10In our applications, if the bid/price of a′i is tied at the highest bid/lowest price, then
πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i) is the expected payoﬀ deﬁned by the tie-breaking lottery speciﬁed in the rules of
the game.
11For instance, let Δ∗ be the maximum ex-post regret across all valuation types of all players and
A∗ be the maximum number of actions that any player has. Then any q(·) such that q(x) ∈
[
0, 1
A∗Δ∗
)
and q(x) > 0 ⇐⇒ x > 0 will fulﬁll these properties. We provide another set of speciﬁcations in
our stochastic stability analysis.
12A recurrent class is a set of states such that if the process reaches one of them, it will never
leave the set, and such that it does not admit a proper subset of states with the same property. An
absorbing state is a singleton recurrent class.
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MRM/G(q). When switches to actions happen after an agent has ex-post regret, the
analysis will reveal which actions are taken in the long run by a ﬁxed set of players
(ﬁxed matching) and which distributions of actions are more likely to emerge in the
long run in the large populations (random matching).
3 Long-Run Behavior under Fixed Matching
Let G(v1, . . . , vN) denote the complete information game in which the valuations
of the players are {v1, . . . , vN}, the sets of actions are (Ai)i∈N and the payoﬀs are
given by the functions (πi(vi, ·, ·))i∈N . This will be the underlying game once a ﬁxed
matching happens, though recall that our players do not know the other players’
valuations.
Let A =
∏
i∈N Ai. For any (ai, a−i) ∈ A, the set of same-or-better replies for the
player of valuation vi is
Rvi(ai, a−i) = {a
′
i ∈ Ai|either a
′
i = ai or πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i) > πi(vi, ai, a−i)}.
Let RG(v1,...,vN ) : A → A be the same-or-better-reply correspondence of the game
G(v1, . . . , vN), i.e.,
RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) =
∏
i∈N
Rvi(ai, a−i).
Deﬁnition 3.1. A set of action proﬁles Aˆ ⊆ A in G(v1, . . . , vN) is closed under
same-or-better replies (henceforth, CUSOBR set) if for all (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ Aˆ, we have
RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ Aˆ. A minimal CUSOBR set is a CUSOBR set that does
not contain a proper subset that is a CUSOBR set.
For any nonempty Aˆ ⊆ A, deﬁne
R˜G(v1,...,vN )(Aˆ) =
⋃
(a1,...,aN )∈Aˆ
(∏
i∈N
Rvi(ai, a−i)
)
.
Equivalently, Aˆ is a CUSOBR set if and only if Aˆ is a ﬁxed point of R˜G(v1,...,vN ), i.e.,
R˜G(v1,...,vN )(Aˆ) = Aˆ.
It is easy to see that (a1, . . . , aN) is a pure Nash equilibrium of G(v1, . . . , vN) if
and only if {(a1, . . . , aN)} is a singleton minimal CUSOBR set. Furthermore, since
the game G(v1, . . . , vN) has a ﬁnite number of action proﬁles, there exists a minimal
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CUSOBR set.
CUSOBR sets are related to product sets that are closed under weakly better
replies (Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)); we discuss the diﬀerences at present. For
any (ai, a−i) ∈ A, the set of weakly-better replies for the player of valuation vi is
WBRvi(ai, a−i) = {a
′
i ∈ Ai|πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i) ≥ πi(vi, ai, a−i)}.
Let WBRG(v1,...,vN ) : A → A be the weakly-better-reply correspondence of the game
G(v1, . . . , vN), i.e.,
WBRG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) =
∏
i∈N
WBRvi(ai, a−i).
A product set of action proﬁles Aˆ ⊆ A is such that Aˆ =
∏
i∈N Aˆi, where ∅ 
= Aˆi ⊆
Ai, ∀i ∈ N . Then, Aˆ is a product set of action proﬁles that is closed under weakly bet-
ter replies (or PCUWBR set) if Aˆ is a product set and WBRG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆
Aˆ for all (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ Aˆ.
13 A minimal PCUWBR set is a PCUWBR set that does
not contain a proper subset that is a PCUWBR set.
Since RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ WBRG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN), every PCUWBR set
contains a CUSOBR set. Hence, every minimal PCUWBR set contains a minimal
CUSOBR set. Therefore, in some games, the set of minimal CUSOBR sets is a
reﬁnement of the set of minimal PCUWBR sets. Game (a) in Figure 1 is an example;
its unique minimal CUSOBR set {(D,R)} is a reﬁnement of its unique minimal
PCUWBR set {(U,L), (U,R), (D,L), (D,R)}. However, it is not necessary that every
minimal CUSOBR set of a game is a subset of some minimal PCUWBR set. Game
(b) in Figure 1 is an example; {(D,L)} is its unique minimal PCUWBR set whereas
it has two minimal CUSOBR sets, {(D,L)} and {(U,R)}. Finally, unlike minimal
PCUWBR sets, minimal CUSOBR sets are not necessarily product sets. Game (c) in
Figure 1 has a unique minimal CUSOBR set {(U,L), (M,L), (M,R), (D,L), (D,R)},
which is not a product set.
Consider any ﬁxed matching in which {v1, . . . , vN} are the valuations of the se-
13This deﬁnition is equivalent to the original deﬁnition by Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) where
the weakly-better-reply correspondence is deﬁned over the domain of mixed strategies. For any
Aˆi ⊆ Ai, let S(Aˆi) be the set of mixed strategies with support in Aˆi. The weakly-better-
reply correspondence over the domain of mixed strategies, WBRG(v1,...,vN ) :
∏
i∈N S(Ai) → A is
such that WBRG(v1,...,vN )(s1, . . . , sN) =
∏
i∈N WBRvi(si, s−i), where WBRvi(si, s−i) = {a
′
i ∈
Ai|Es−i(πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i)) ≥ Esi,s−i(πi(vi, ai, a−i))}, ∀i ∈ N . The equivalence follows since for
any product set Aˆ =
∏
i∈N Aˆi, WBRG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ Aˆ, ∀(a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ Aˆ ⇐⇒
WBRG(v1,...,vN )(s1, . . . , sN ) ⊆ Aˆ, ∀(s1, . . . , sN ) ∈
∏
i∈N S(Aˆi).
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L R
U 1, 3 3, 1
D 2, 0 3, 2
(a)
L R
U 1, 1 0, 1
D 2, 3 0, 2
(b)
L R
U 1, 0 0, 0
M 0, 1 2, 0
D 2, 0 0, 1
(c)
Figure 1
lected players. Deﬁne a state of the matched players in a period as the current
action proﬁle (a1, . . . , aN ) of the players. Hence, A is the set of states. Our interest
in minimal CUSOBR sets stems from the following result:
Proposition 3.2. Let {v1, . . . , vN} be the valuations of the matched players under
ﬁxed matching. Then, Aˆ is a recurrent class of MFM/G(q) if and only if Aˆ is a
minimal CUSOBR set of G(v1, . . . , vN).
3.1 Weakly Acyclic Games
A stronger result can be established if G(v1, . . . , vN) is weakly acyclic under better
replies. A better-reply graph is deﬁned as follows: each action proﬁle of G(v1, . . . , vN)
is a vertex of the graph and there exists a directed edge from vertex (a1, . . . , aN) to
vertex (a′1, . . . , a
′
N) if and only if (a1, . . . , aN) 
= (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N) and (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N) ∈
RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN). A sink is a vertex with no outgoing edges. A better-reply
path is a sequence of vertices (a11, . . . , a
1
N ), . . . , (a
L
1 , . . . , a
L
N) such that there exists a
directed edge from each (al1, . . . , a
l
N) to (a
l+1
1 , . . . , a
l+1
N ). The game G(v1, . . . , vN) is
weakly acyclic under better replies if from any action proﬁle, there exists at least one
better-reply path to a sink. Clearly, an action proﬁle is a sink if and only if it is a pure
Nash equilibrium of G(v1, . . . , vN). Thus, the game G(v1, . . . , vN ) is weakly acyclic
under better replies if from any action proﬁle there exists at least one better-reply
path to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Remark: Young (2004) deﬁnes a closely related class of weakly acyclic complete
information games.14 A single-better-reply graph is deﬁned as follows: each action
proﬁle of G(v1, . . . , vN) is a vertex of the graph and there exists a directed edge
from vertex (a1, . . . , aN) to vertex (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N) if and only if there exists exactly one
player such that a′i 
= ai, and πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i) > πi(vi, ai, a−i). A single-better-reply path
14Note that Young (2004) uses the term “weakly acyclic under better replies” to describe this
class. We modify his terminology.
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and a game being weakly acyclic under single-better replies are deﬁned similarly as
above. Again, an action proﬁle is a sink if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium
of G(v1, . . . , vN). Thus, the game G(v1, . . . , vN) is weakly acyclic under single-better
replies if from any action proﬁle there exists at least one single-better-reply path to
a pure Nash equilibrium.
Since a single-better-reply graph is a subgraph of a better-reply graph, a game
is weakly acyclic under single-better replies only if it is weakly acyclic under better
replies. In fact, the former class of games is smaller than the latter. For example,
consider the following game with three players (row, column and matrix) and two
actions for each player:
L R
U 0, 1, 1 1, 0, 0
D 1, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
A
L R
U 1, 0, 0 1, 0, 0
D 0, 1, 1 1, 1, 0
B
Figure 2: A game that is weakly acyclic under better replies but not weakly acyclic
under single-better replies.
The single-better-reply graph of this game has two sinks corresponding to the
two pure Nash equilibria, (U,R,B) and (D,R,B), and the rest of action proﬁles
form a connected component (see Figure 3). Thus, the game is not weakly acyclic
under single-better replies. However, in addition to the directed edges in the single-
better-reply graph, there exists one more directed edge from (D,L,A) to (D,R,B)
in the better-reply graph (see Figure 4). Over this edge, two players switch to better
replies: the column player from L to R and the matrix player from A to B. Thus,
this game is weakly acyclic under better replies.
The result in the current subsection, stronger than the ﬁrst proposition stated
earlier, is this:
Lemma 3.3. If G(v1, . . . , vN ) is weakly acyclic under better replies, then Aˆ is a
minimal CUSOBR set if and only if Aˆ is a singleton, i.e., Aˆ = {(a1, . . . , aN )}, and
(a1, . . . , aN ) is a pure Nash equilibrium of G(v1 . . . , vN ).
As a corollary to the above lemma and Proposition 3.2, we obtain the following
result.
12
UD
L R
0,1,1
1,0,0
1,0,0
0,1,0
U
D
L R
A B
1,0,0
0,1,1
1,0,0
1,1,0
Figure 3: Single-Better-Reply Graph of the game in Figure 2
U
D
L R
0,1,1
1,0,0
1,0,0
0,1,0
U
D
L R
A B
1,0,0
0,1,1
1,0,0
1,1,0
Figure 4: Better-Reply Graph of the game in Figure 2
Corollary 3.4. Let {v1, . . . , vN} be the valuations of the matched players under ﬁxed
matching and suppose G(v1, . . . , vN) is weakly acyclic under better replies. All recur-
rent classes of MFM/G(q) are singletons. Furthermore, (a1, . . . , aN) is an absorbing
state if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of G(v1, . . . , vN).
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Remark: Thus, in spite of the initial incomplete information, ex-post regret learn-
ing under ﬁxed matching gives players enough experience so that, when switches
happen in the direction of ex-post regrets and the game is weakly acyclic under bet-
15Our dynamics is uncoupled in the sense of Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) and convergence to Nash
equilibrium is obtained only in a speciﬁc class of games, while those authors seek a convergence
result in all games. Our convergence to Nash equilibrium is a consequence of the ﬁxed matching
and the weakly acyclic property of the game.
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ter replies, play in the game always converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
of the complete information game corresponding to the valuations of the players in
the match. Examples will be provided in our subsections on applications.
3.1.1 Applications: Second-Price Auctions, First-Price Auctions and
Bertrand Duopolies
We now illustrate our results by studying speciﬁc games with our ex-post regret
learning process under ﬁxed matching. To begin, consider the second-price auction
with N ≥ 2 bidders and one seller. In each period, each seller is selling a single
indivisible object and each bidder is interested in buying at most one unit of the
good. Any seller of that indivisible object values it at 0 and this is known to the
potential bidders. Let S0 denote the population of sellers. There are a large number
of potential bidders, Pi, who play in position i ∈ N . The valuation of any bidder in
position i, vi ∈ Z ≡ {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 1}.
Under ﬁxed matching, a single seller is selected randomly from the population
S0. The selected seller is then matched with N ≥ 2 bidders, where bidder for
position i is selected randomly and independently from Pi. These matched players
repeatedly play the second-price auction in every period. The rules of the auction
are as follows: all the bidders matched to the seller simultaneously announce their
bids for the object. A bidder can bid any number in Z. The bidder with the highest
bid wins the object. The bidder who wins the object pays a price equal to the
second-highest bid.16 If the object is traded at price p, the winning bidder i’s payoﬀ
is vi−p and all the other bidders matched to the seller get a payoﬀ of 0. The seller’s
payoﬀ is p. Each bidder in population Pi can be identiﬁed by her valuation vi and
her unique bid ai that she bids in the event she is matched with a seller.
Let {v1, . . . , vN} be the valuations of the matched bidders under ﬁxed matching.
The set of states is ZN , the collection of all possible bid proﬁles.
Lemma 3.5. The one-shot second-price auction in which the valuations {v1, . . . , vN}
of the N bidders are common knowledge is weakly acyclic under better replies.
The following corollary follows from the above lemma and Corollary 3.4:
Corollary 3.6. In the ﬁxed-matching model, when the game is a second-price auc-
tion, all recurrent classes of MFM/SPA(q) are singletons. Furthermore, (a1, . . . , aN)
16If more than one bidder bid the highest amount, then the object is allocated at random among
the highest bidders and the price is equal to their bid.
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is an absorbing state if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
second-price auction in which the valuations {v1, . . . , vN} of the N bidders are com-
mon knowledge.17
Now suppose that in every period, the seller uses the ﬁrst-price auction to sell
her object to the set of bidders that are matched to her. The only change in the
rules is that the bidder who wins the object pays a price equal to her bid.
Lemma 3.7. The one-shot ﬁrst-price auction in which the valuations {v1, . . . , vN}
of the N bidders are common knowledge is weakly acyclic under better replies.
So we obtain the following corollary using the above lemma and Corollary 3.4:
Corollary 3.8. In the ﬁxed-matching model, when the game is a ﬁrst-price auction,
all recurrent classes of MFM/FPA(q) are singletons. Furthermore, (a1, . . . , aN) is an
absorbing state if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of the one-shot ﬁrst-price
auction in which the valuations {v1, . . . , vN} of the N bidders are common knowledge.
Consider next a game of Bertrand duopoly competition. The market demand for
a good at price p is Q = (x − p)/y, where x, y > 0. There are a large number of
potential sellers of the good. Let Pi be the population of sellers who play in position
i ∈ {1, 2}. The cost of producing Qi units of the good to a seller in position i is
ciQi, where ci ∈ C ≡ {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , x} is her constant marginal cost (note that x is
some multiple of δ). A seller’s marginal cost is her private value, her type. For each
i ∈ {1, 2} and ci ∈ C, there exists a nonempty set of sellers Pci ⊆ Pi whose marginal
costs equal ci.
In Bertrand competition, the two matched sellers simultaneously post their prices
p1 and p2 for the object, where each pi ∈ P = {0,
δ
2
, δ, . . . , x− δ
2
, x}. This ensures that
each marginal cost type ci can post her monopoly proﬁt maximizing price p
∗(ci) =
x+ci
2
. We assume that the buyers purchase the good from the cheaper seller and if
both sellers charge the same price, then each seller captures the market, i.e., supplies
the market demand, with equal probability. Hence, for any (p1, p2), seller i’s ex-post
payoﬀ is 0 if either pi > pj or pi = pj and she looses the tie-breaking lottery, and
17 Strictly speaking, applying Corollary 3.4 requires that the matched bidders are repeatedly
playing a game. This is not the case here since the bidders adapt their bids in the ex-post stage.
Therefore, in the event of a tie at the winning bid, the ex-post payoﬀ of a bidder need not equal her
expected payoﬀ (where the expectation is with respect to the tie-breaking lottery). Nevertheless,
given a−i, the expected payoﬀ of bidder of valuation vi from bidding a
′
i is greater than her expected
payoﬀ from bidding ai if and only if in some ex-post event her regret Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i) > 0. This fact
and Lemma 3.5 are suﬃcient to establish the corollary. Similar comments apply to Corollaries 4.8,
3.8 and 3.10.
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(pi−ci)(x−pi)
y
if either pi < pj or pi = pj and she wins the tie-breaking lottery.
18 Each
seller in population Pi can be identiﬁed by her marginal cost ci and her unique price
pi that she posts in the event she is matched with another seller.
Under ﬁxed matching, let {c1, c2} be the marginal costs of the two matched sellers.
A state of the matched sellers in a period is a proﬁle of each seller’s price, (p1, p2).
Thus, the set of states is P 2.
Lemma 3.9. The one-shot Bertrand duopoly game in which the marginal costs
{c1, c2} of the two sellers are common knowledge is weakly acyclic under better replies.
The following corollary follows from the above lemma and Corollary 3.4:
Corollary 3.10. In the ﬁxed-matching model, when the game is Bertrand duopoly
competition, all recurrent classes ofMFM/BC(q) are singletons. Furthermore, (p1, p2)
is an absorbing state if and only if it is a pure Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
Bertrand game in which the marginal costs {c1, c2} of the two sellers are common
knowledge.
Remark: In all our applications, the ex-post regret learning dynamics converges to
one of the pure Nash equilibria of the game; which equilibrium will be the limit of
the dynamics is a function of the initial condition. The general point, nonetheless, is
how Nash play emerges through using the learning process on the ﬁxed set of players,
in spite of the restrictive informational assumptions.
4 Long-Run Behavior under Random Matching
There is a game of incomplete information that corresponds to the random matching
of the players. In this game, the set of strategies of valuation vi, Σi(vi), can be
identiﬁed with the set of distributions of actions Ai in the population Pvi . Let σi(vi)
denote a strategy of valuation vi. Given σi(vi), let σi(vi, ai) be the relative frequency
of action ai and Ai(σi(vi)) denote the support of σi(vi). The strategy of position i, σi,
is a collection of strategies of all valuations vi ∈ Vi. Let Σi be the set of strategies of
position i. A strategy proﬁle (σ1, . . . , σN) is a collection of strategies of all positions.
For any (σi, σ−i) ∈ Σ and (vi, v−i) ∈ V , the expected payoﬀ of position i is
πi(vi, σi(vi), σ−i(v−i)) = Eσ1(v1),...,σN (vN )(πi(vi, ai, a−i)).
18See Spulber (1995) for the equilibrium analysis of the winner-takes-all Bertrand competition
with unknown but continuously distributed marginal costs.
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Let G(RM) be the N -position incomplete information game with valuations (Vi)i∈N ,
strategies (Σi)i∈N and expected payoﬀs in each ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) given by(
πi(vi, σi(vi), σ−i(v−i)
)
i∈N .
For any σi(vi), σ
′
i(vi) ∈ Σi(vi), let d(σi(vi), σ
′
i(vi)) denote the Euclidean distance
between σi(vi) and σ
′
i(vi). We say that strategy σ
′
i is adjacent to strategy σi if there
exists a vi ∈ Vi such that d(σi(v
′
i), σ
′
i(v
′
i)) = 0, ∀v
′
i 
= vi, and d(σi(vi), σ
′
i(vi)) =
√
2
|Pvi |
,
where |Pvi | is the number of players in population Pvi (i.e., in terms of the underlying
distributions of actions in the population of players, σ′i is adjacent to σi if exactly one
player of valuation vi plays diﬀerently in σi than in σ
′
i). For any σ
′
i that is adjacent to
σi, let v
(σi,σ′i)
i ∈ Vi be the unique valuation such that the distance between σi(v
(σi,σ′i)
i )
and σ′i(v
(σi,σ
′
i)
i ) is positive. Furthermore, there exist exactly two actions in Ai, say
a
(σi,σ′i)
i and a
′
i
(σi,σ′i), such that
σi(v
(σi,σ′i)
i , a
(σi,σ′i)
i ) = σ
′
i(v
(σi,σ′i)
i , a
(σi,σ′i)
i ) +
1
|Pvi |
,
and σ′i(v
(σi,σ′i)
i , a
′
i
(σi,σ
′
i)) = σi(v
(σi,σ′i)
i , a
′
i
(σi,σ
′
i)) +
1
|Pvi |
.
For any σi ∈ Σi, let
Σi(σi) = {σ
′
i ∈ Σi|either σ
′
i = σi or σ
′
i is adjacent to σi}.
Let V =
∏
i∈N Vi and Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi. For any (σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ Σ, the action proﬁles
that will be played with a positive probability conditional on the realization of types
(v1, . . . , vN) ∈ V is given by
∏
i∈N Ai(σi(vi)).
The same-or-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply correspondence of the game G(RM),
RG(RM) : Σ → Σ, is deﬁned as follows: (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N) ∈ RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN) if and
only if
1. (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) ∈
∏
i∈N Σi(σi) and
2. if (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) 
= (σ1, . . . , σN), then let I = {i|σi 
= σ
′
i}. There must exist
(v1, . . . , vN) ∈ V and (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai(σi(vi)) such that for all i ∈ I, we
have vi = v
(σi,σ
′
i)
i , ai = a
(σi,σ
′
i)
i and
πi(v
(σi,σ
′
i)
i , a
′
i
(σi,σ
′
i), a−i) > πi(v
(σi,σ
′
i)
i , a
(σi,σ
′
i)
i , a−i).
The ﬁrst condition says that (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N ) is such that for all i, σ
′
i is either the same or
adjacent to σi. Now, if (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N) diﬀers from (σ1, . . . , σN), then by the deﬁnition
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of the set I, σ′i is adjacent to σi for all i ∈ I. The second condition says that for all
i ∈ I, this change in strategy should be justiﬁed as an ex-post better reply, i.e., there
must exist an ex-post event in which for all i ∈ I, the realized valuation vi = v
(σi,σ
′
i)
i ,
the realized action ai = a
(σi,σ′i)
i , and the action a
′
i
(σi,σ′i) is a better reply to a−i than
the action a
(σi,σ′i)
i .
Deﬁnition 4.1. A set of strategy proﬁles Σˆ ⊆ Σ in G(RM) is closed under same-or-
adjacent-ex-post-better replies (henceforth, CUSOAEBR set) if for all (σ1, . . . , σN) ∈
Σˆ, we have RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN) ⊆ Σˆ. A minimal CUSOAEBR set is a CUSOAEBR
set that does not contain a smaller CUSOAEBR set.
For any nonempty Σˆ ⊆ Σ, deﬁne
R˜G(RM)(Σˆ) =
⋃
(σ1,...,σN )∈Σˆ
RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN).
Equivalently, Σˆ is a CUSOAEBR set if and only if Σˆ is a ﬁxed point of R˜G(RM), i.e.,
R˜G(RM)(Σˆ) = Σˆ.
Since G(RM) has a ﬁnite number of strategy proﬁles, there exists a minimal
CUSOAEBR set.
Remark: Suppose there is a unique valuation type for all positions, i.e., Vi =
{vi}, ∀i ∈ N . Then G(RM) is an extension of G(v1, . . . , vN) to mixed strategies Σ.
Thus, G(RM) is a complete information game in which the valuations of the players
are {v1, . . . , vN}, the sets of strategies are (Σi)i∈N and the payoﬀs are given by the
functions (πi(vi, σi, σ−i))i∈N . In this case, if Σˆ is a CUSOAEBR set of G(RM), then
the set of action proﬁles that are in the support of Σˆ, i.e.,
⋃
(σ1,...,σN )∈Σˆ
(∏
i∈N
Ai(σi(vi))
)
is a CUSOBR set of G(v1, . . . , vN).
Deﬁnition 4.2. A strategy proﬁle (σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ Σ is an ex-post equilibrium of
G(RM) if for all i ∈ N and all (vi, v−i) ∈ V ,
πi(vi, σi(vi), σ−i(v−i)) ≥ πi(vi, σ
′
i(vi), σ−i(v−i)), ∀σ
′
i ∈ Σi.
Thus, in every ex-post state (vi, v−i), each player i’s mixed strategy σi(vi) is a best
response to the mixed-strategy proﬁle σ−i(v−i).
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A strategy proﬁle (σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ Σ is a pure ex-post equilibrium of G(RM) if for
all i ∈ N , (vi, v−i) ∈ V and (ai, a−i) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σj(vj)),
πi(vi, ai, a−i) ≥ πi(vi, a′i, a−i), ∀a
′
i ∈ Ai.
There is a slight abuse of language in our use of the term “pure” here. Essentially,
we are also allowing a mixed-strategy ex-post equilibrium (i.e., types can play non-
degenerate mixed strategies) such that in every ex-post event, every action proﬁle,
which is in the support of the mixed-strategy proﬁle corresponding to that ex-post
event, is a pure Nash equilibrium. But there is a puriﬁcation argument for any such
mixed equilibrium, by having the appropriate proportions in the population of each
type play the pure actions in the support of the mixed strategy.
Lemma 4.3. A strategy proﬁle (σ1, . . . , σN) is a pure ex-post equilibrium of G(RM)
if and only if {(σ1, . . . , σN)} is a singleton CUSOAEBR set.
A state in a period is a list specifying for all i ∈ N and vi ∈ Vi, the distribution
of actions Ai in population Pvi . Hence, a state is a strategy proﬁle of G(RM) and
the set of states is Σ. Given G and random matching of the players, for ﬁxed switch
function q(·), consider now the learning rule presented in Section 2 and the associated
Markov process MRM/G(q) on the state space Σ.
Proposition 4.4. Σˆ is a recurrent class of MRM/G(q) if and only if Σˆ is a minimal
CUSOAEBR set of G(RM).
4.1 Weakly Acyclic Games
As in the ﬁxed-matching model, stronger results are obtained for weakly acyclic
games. An adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph is deﬁned as follows: each strategy pro-
ﬁle (σ1, . . . , σN) of G(RM) is a vertex of the graph. There exists a directed edge from
vertex (σ1, . . . , σN) to vertex (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N) if and only if (σ1, . . . , σN ) 
= (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N)
and (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N ) ∈ RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN). An adjacent-ex-post-better-reply path is a
sequence of vertices (σ11, . . . , σ
1
N), . . . , (σ
L
1 , . . . , σ
L
N) such that there exists a directed
edge from each (σl1, . . . , σ
l
N ) to (σ
l+1
1 , . . . , σ
l+1
N ). The game G(RM) is weakly acyclic
under adjacent-ex-post-better replies if from any strategy proﬁle, there exists at least
one adjacent-ex-post-better-reply path to a sink. Note that a strategy proﬁle is a
sink if and only if it is a pure ex-post equilibrium of G(RM) (using Lemma 4.3).
Thus, the game G(RM) is weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies if
19
from any strategy proﬁle there exists at least one adjacent-ex-post-better-reply path
to a pure ex-post equilibrium.
Lemma 4.5. If G(RM) is weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies, then
Σˆ is a minimal CUSOAEBR set if and only if Σˆ is a singleton, i.e., Σˆ = {(σ1, . . . , σN)},
and (σ1, . . . , σN) is a pure ex-post equilibrium of G(RM).
We obtain the following result as a corollary to the above lemma and Proposition
4.4.
Corollary 4.6. Suppose G(RM) is weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies.
All recurrent classes of MRM/G(q) are singletons. Furthermore, (σ1, . . . , σN) is an
absorbing state if and only if it is a pure ex-post equilibrium of G(RM).
Remark: Thus, when players are randomly matched and they use ex-post regret
learning in a game that is weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies, all
valuation types of all players will play in the long run according to some pure ex-post
equilibrium of the game.
4.1.1 Application: Second-Price Auctions
Under random matching, in each period t, a single seller is selected randomly from
the population S0. The selected seller is then matched with N ≥ 2 bidders, where
bidder for position i is selected randomly and independently from Pi. These matched
players play the second-price auction in period t. After the end of the auction, these
players return to their respective populations. A new set of players is selected in
period t + 1 and so on.
Let SPA(RM) denote the incomplete information game corresponding to the
random matching of the players when the matched players play the second-price
auction. Thus, SPA(RM) is the N -bidder one-shot second-price auction under
incomplete information with valuations Vi = Z, ∀i ∈ N , and strategies (Σi)i∈N ,
where Σi is the set of distributions of bids in populations Pvi , ∀vi ∈ Z.
Lemma 4.7. SPA(RM) is weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies.
The next corollary follows from the above lemma and Corollary 4.6:
Corollary 4.8. In the random-matching model, when the game is a second-price auc-
tion, all recurrent classes of MRM/SPA(q) are singletons. Furthermore, (σ1, . . . , σN)
is an absorbing state if and only if it is a pure ex-post equilibrium of SPA(RM).
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Remark: One pure ex-post equilibrium is truth telling. However, there also exist
pure ex-post equilibria of SPA(RM) that are ex-post ineﬃcient (this is also true for
the standard one-shot second-price auction model in which the valuations are con-
tinuously distributed on a certain interval and bidders can use any mixed strategy).
An example is the following strategy proﬁle: let n ∈ (0, 1/δ) and
σ1(v1, nδ) = 1, ∀v1 ≤ nδ, and σ1(v1, v1) = 1, ∀v1 > nδ,
and for all i 
= 1
σi(vi, 0) = 1, ∀vi ≤ nδ, and σi(vi, vi) = 1, ∀vi > nδ.
Hence, even such ineﬃcient pure ex-post equilibria are absorbing states of the ex-post
regret dynamics under random matching.19
4.2 Stochastic Stability
A necessary condition for a game to be weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better
replies is that it has an ex-post equilibrium, which is often not satisﬁed (for instance,
our applications to ﬁrst-price auction and Bertrand competition in the sequel are not
weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies). The recurrent classes of the
process MRM/G(q) will typically be very large, oﬀering limited prediction.
In an attempt to provide a sharper prediction in these cases, we shall now spec-
ify q(Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i)) = q
1
Δi(vi,ai,a
′
i
,a
−i) , i.e., q is now a positive parameter that is
suﬃciently small to ensure positive probability of inertia. Thus, switches to other
actions are an increasing function of the corresponding ex-post regret, and the way
in which ex-post regret aﬀects switching probabilities is exponential. But now, in
addition, if Δi(vi, ai, a
′
i, a−i) ≤ 0, then agent i changes her action to a
′
i in period t+1
with probability q
1
γ , where γ > 0 is smaller than any ex-post regret.20 Allowing for
a positive γ leads to ergodic dynamics.
Letting α = q
1
γ be the probability of an individual’s “mistake” –a switch under
19Note how if we had a single population model –which is a reasonable alternative model since the
game is symmetric–, these ineﬃcient equilibria would be eliminated. Consider the above strategy
proﬁle. With a single population, the bidders in position 1 will also meet each other, and hence,
those who bid above their valuations will experience positive regret. This is the only result of
our three applications where the assumption of single versus multiple populations would make any
qualitative diﬀerence.
20This minimum (positive) ex-post regret is well-deﬁned since the sets of players, valuations and
actions are ﬁnite.
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no regret–, we are now interested in analyzing the long run properties of the random
process MRM/G(q, α) when α is a small but positive constant. This is an irreducible
and aperiodic process, and it is a regular perturbation of MRM/G(q, 0), which cor-
responds to the random matching ex-post regret learning process of Section 2. It
is known that it admits a unique invariant distribution for each α > 0 and q > 0.
Further, the support of its limiting distribution as α → 0 (which is the same as
γ → 0) is contained within the recurrent classes of the corresponding Markov pro-
cess with α = 0. However, as we just observed, such recurrent classes are very large
and therefore we propose to perform a diﬀerent exercise.
We ﬁx γ > 0 and take the limit with respect to q → 0.21 If one ﬁxes γ > 0 and
allows q to go to zero, the process MRM/G(q, α) is a regular perturbed process of
MRM/G(0, 0). Hence, as q → 0, the support of the unique invariant distribution of
MRM/G(q, α) is contained within the recurrent classes of MRM/G(0, 0), which are all
singletons (indeed, the set of absorbing classes of MRM/G(0, 0) coincides with the
set of states). Following Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), we
refer to the states that are in the support of this limiting distribution as stochastically
stable. The limiting distribution approximates both the frequency with which a state
is visited over a long horizon and the probability of being in a particular state at a
point in time. Hence, the stochastically stable states are the only states on which
the system will spend a positive proportion of time in the very long run when the
switches of actions are possible but very unlikely events.22
Consider any two diﬀerent states σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) and σ
′ = (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) such
that there is a positive probability of moving from the former to the latter in one
period under the Markov process MRM/G(q, α). This probability is of the order q
r
for some unique r > 0 as q → 0. Deﬁne the resistance of going from σ and σ′ as
r(σ, σ′) = r.23
A weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph is an adjacent-ex-post-better-reply
graph with weights assigned to all directed edges. Pick the directed edge from
σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) to σ
′ = (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) in the adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph.
21The limit exercise allows us to obtain an analytical result. However, we point out that we have
conﬁrmed the result for ﬁxed small values of q via simulations (available upon request).
22This analysis still respects the ordinality of payoﬀs in the game. Speciﬁcally, the results are
robust to any transformation λ of the probability of switching as follows: a player with valuation
vi changes her action from ai to a
′
i ∈ Ai \ {ai} with probability q
1
λ(max{Δi(vi,ai,a
′
i
,a−i),γ}) , where
λ : ++ → ++ is a strictly increasing function.
23To calculate r(σ, σ′), consider any match that can occur in state σ, which includes all the
players who switch their action between σ and σ′. For each such match, sum the reciprocals of the
ex-post regrets of the players who switch their action between σ and σ′ (if the ex-post regret of any
player is non-positive, then add 1
γ
instead). The lowest such sum is r(σ, σ′).
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Since σ′ ∈ RG(RM)(σ), there is a positive probability of moving from σ to σ′ in one
period under the Markov Process MRM/G(q, α) (see the proof of Proposition 4.4).
Deﬁne the weight of this directed edge as r(σ, σ′), which is positive by the deﬁnition
of resistance. A weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply path is a sequence of vertices
(σ11, . . . , σ
1
N ), . . . , (σ
L
1 , . . . , σ
L
N) and weights w
1, . . . , wL−1 such that there exists a di-
rected edge from each (σl1, . . . , σ
l
N) to (σ
l+1
1 , . . . , σ
l+1
N ) with weight w
l. A weighted
cycle is a weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply path that begins and ends at the
same vertex with no other repetition of vertices.
Next, we shall identify the stochastically stable states by eliminating states that
pass the following weighted cycle test. This has interest in its own right as it provides
a necessary condition for stochastic stability in processes like ours.
Proposition 4.9. (Weighted cycle test) (σ1, . . . , σN) is not stochastically stable if
there exists an outgoing edge from (σ1, . . . , σN) with weight less than
1
γ
and either of
the following hold:
1. There does not exist any weighted cycle containing this outgoing edge.
2. In all weighted cycles containing this outgoing edge, the weight of this outgoing
edge is less than the weight of some other edge on the weighted cycle.
This test substantially simpliﬁes the search for the stochastically stable states.
Since every state in Σ is absorbing in the process MRM/G(0, 0), the standard tech-
nique of constructing rooted trees in order to ﬁnd the minimal rooted trees would
require calculating resistances between any two states in Σ. In contrast, in order to
perform the weighted cycle test, we need to construct a single graph –the adjacent-
ex-post-better-reply graph– and calculate the resistances of only the edges in this
graph.
Remark: The necessary condition stated in the proposition is subtle. In particular,
we cannot say that (σ1, . . . , σN ) is stochastically stable only if (σ1, . . . , σN) belongs
to a minimal CUSOAEBR set. For instance, let σ1 be stochastically stable and not
belong to any minimal CUSOAEBR set. We know that from any state σ1 that does
not belong to a minimal CUSOAEBR set, there exists a weighted-adjacent-ex-post-
better-reply path σ1, . . . , σL such that σL is in some minimal CUSOAEBR set. We
also know that there does not exist any weighted cycle containing this path. However,
there could exist a weighted cycle containing the ﬁrst edge σ1, σ2.
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4.2.1 Applications: First-Price Auctions and Bertrand Duopolies
Most games are not weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better-replies. As illus-
trations, consider ﬁrst-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies. The analysis, through
the use of stochastic stability, points in the direction of minimax-regret equilibrium
(Hyaﬁl and Boutilier (2004)). We remark that any ex-post equilibrium is also a
minimax-regret equilibrium, but not vice versa. Indeed, for games with incomplete
information that are not described by probabilistic beliefs (games with strict type
uncertainty, in their terminology), these authors obtain a remarkable existence result
for this concept.
Let FPA(RM) denote the incomplete information game corresponding to the
random matching of the players when the matched players play the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion. Thus, FPA(RM) is the N -bidder one-shot ﬁrst-price auction under incomplete
information with valuations Vi = Z, ∀i ∈ N , and strategies (Σi)i∈N , where Σi is the
set of distributions of bids in populations Pvi , ∀vi ∈ Z.
Lemma 4.10. Suppose 2δ < 1. FPA(RM) has a unique minimal CUSOAEBR
set Σˆ. Furthermore, ∀i ∈ N , vi > 2δ, and ai ∈ [δ, vi − 2δ]
⋂
Z, there exists a
(σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ Σˆ such that σi(vi, ai) = 1.
As a corollary of the above lemma and Proposition 4.4, it follows that when δ is
small enough, the process MRM/FPA(q) has a unique large recurrent class.
24 Hence,
the answer obtained simply by looking at this recurrent class is not informative.
As a possible way to increase predictive power, the next proposition identiﬁes the
stochastically stable states of MRM/FPA(q, α) as q → 0.
Proposition 4.11. In the random-matching model, when the game is a ﬁrst-price
auction, if (σ1, . . . , σN) is stochastically stable in MRM/FPA(q, α) as q → 0, then
∀i ∈ N and vi ∈ Z, we have σi(vi, ai) > 0 only if ai ∈
[
vi−δ
2
, vi+δ
2
]⋂
Z.
That is, when switches are unlikely events, all bidders bid approximately half
their valuations almost all the time. We prove this by showing that a state that
does not satisfy the condition in the proposition passes the weighted cycle test and
hence, it is not stochastically stable. The intuition is as follows. Suppose in a state
σ, the bidder i of valuation vi > δ is bidding z < vi (the proof takes care of all
cases). The bidder gains from adjusting her bid upwards only when it converts her
from a looser to a winner, while she gains from adjusting her bid downwards only
24Applying Proposition 4.4 also requires that the randomly matched bidders are repeatedly play-
ing a game; see footnote 17.
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when it reduces the price of winning the object. If z > vi+δ
2
, then the maximum gain
from adjusting her bid downwards is equal to the highest price fall z − δ (when the
highest opposing bid encountered by her is 0). Since all 0 valuation types must bid
0 – the unique no-regret bid for 0 valuation bidders– there is a positive probability
that the last highest bid encountered by the bidder is 0 and thus, she could obtain
the maximum gain of z− δ by adjusting her bid downwards. Let σ′ be the new state
after this bidder reduces her bid to δ, ceteris paribus. Since the bidder gains z − δ
from this adjustment, the weight of the edge from σ to σ′ in the weighted-adjacent-
ex-post-better-reply graph is at most 1
z−δ <
1
γ
. Now, consider any weighted cycle
containing this outgoing edge. There must be an edge in this cycle such that our
bidder increases her bid from some z˜ < z to some zˆ ≥ z. However, the maximum
gain of the bidder in this transition is vi − zˆ ≤ vi − z < z − δ, when she turns from
loosing at z˜ to winning at zˆ. Hence, the weight of this edge in the weighted cycle is
greater than the weight of the edge from σ to σ′. Therefore, σ passes the weighted
cycle test. On the other hand, if z < vi−δ
2
, then the maximum gain from adjusting
her bid upwards is at least vi − z
∗, where z∗ is the lowest bid that is at least vi−δ
2
.
Now if there is another bidder j who bids z′ such that z ≤ z′ < vi−δ
2
– existence is
shown in the proof– then there is a positive probability that these two bidders meet
and bidder i looses the auction (this happens when all other bidders in this match
have 0 valuations). Then bidder i can obtain the gain of vi − z
∗ by adjusting her
bid upwards to z∗. Let σ′ be the new state after this bidder increases her bid to
z∗, ceteris paribus. The weight of the edge from σ to σ′ in the weighted-adjacent-
ex-post-better-reply graph is at most 1
vi−z∗ <
1
γ
. Now, consider any weighted cycle
containing this outgoing edge. There must be an edge in this cycle such that our
bidder changes her bid from z∗ to some zˆ 
= z∗. If zˆ > z∗, then the maximum gain of
the bidder in this transition is vi− zˆ < vi− z
∗; whereas if zˆ < z∗, then the maximum
gain of the bidder is z∗−δ < vi−z∗ (since z∗ < vi+δ2 ). Hence, the weight of this edge
in the weighted cycle is greater than the weight of the edge from σ to σ′. Therefore,
σ passes the weighted cycle test.
In fact, the stochastically stable bids (approximately) satisfy the following balance
condition: at these bids, a bidder’s maximum gain from increasing her bid (approx.
vi−σi) equals her maximum gain from decreasing it (approx. σi), leading to σi = vi/2.
Equivalently, at a stochastically stable bid, the maximum regret from not having used
a higher bid is equal to the maximum regret from not having used a lower bid.
Remark: In the standard N -bidder one-shot ﬁrst-price auction under incomplete
information with the valuations for each bidder continuously distributed on [0, 1], the
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strategy proﬁle in which each bidder bids half of her valuation is a minimax-regret
equilibrium (Hyaﬁl and Boutilier (2004)). Hence, Proposition 4.11 predicts that if
the bidders repeatedly face a random ﬁrst-price auction environment and they are
very slow to adapt their bids, then in the long run, the distributions of bids in the
populations of bidders will be a minimax-regret equilibrium.
Consider now Bertrand duopolies. Let BC(RM) denote the incomplete informa-
tion game corresponding to the random matching of the sellers when the matched
sellers play the Bertrand duopoly competition game. Thus, BC(RM) is the 2 player
one-shot Bertrand competition game under incomplete information with marginal
costs Vi = C, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, and strategies (Σi)i∈{1,2}, where Σi is the set of distribu-
tions of prices in populations Pci, ∀ci ∈ C.
Lemma 4.12. BC(RM) has a unique minimal CUSOAEBR set Σˆ. Furthermore,
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ci ∈ C \ {0, x}, and pi ∈ [ci +
δ
2
, p∗(ci)]
⋂
P , there exists a (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σˆ
such that σi(ci, pi) = 1.
As a corollary of the above lemma and Proposition 4.4, it follows that the process
MRM/BC(q) has a unique large recurrent class.
25 Hence, the answer obtained simply
by looking at this recurrent class is not informative. As in the ﬁrst-price auction
model, we identify the stochastically stable states of MRM/BC(q, α) as q → 0.
If seller i with marginal cost ci were a monopolist, then the price of pˆ(ci) =
p∗(ci)− x−ci2√2 gives the seller a payoﬀ equal to half of her maximum payoﬀ –it is the
unique such price that is less than p∗(ci). Clearly, there does not exist any price in
P that equals pˆ(ci). Let p
+(ci) be the least element in P that is at least pˆ(ci).
Proposition 4.13. In the random-matching model, when the game is Bertrand
duopoly competition, if (σ1, σ2) is stochastically stable in MRM/BC(q, α) as q → 0,
then ∀i ∈ {1, 2} and ci ∈ C, we have σi(ci, pi) > 0 only if pi ∈ [p
+(ci), p
+(ci)+δ]
⋂
P .
Thus, when switches are unlikely events, any seller with marginal cost ci will post
approximately the price p+(ci) almost all the time. This is because any state that
does not satisfy the condition in the proposition passes the weighted cycle test and
hence, it is not stochastically stable. The intuition is as follows. Suppose in a state
σ, the seller i with marginal cost ci < x posts a price p < p
+(ci). Then p < pˆ(ci)
and so the maximum gain from adjusting her price upwards is greater than half of
her maximum monopoly payoﬀ (x−ci)
2
4y
(when the opponent’s price is greater than
25Again, see footnote 17.
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p∗(ci) and she switches from p to p∗(ci)). Since all sellers with marginal costs equal
to x must post the price x – the unique no-regret price for such sellers –, there is a
positive probability that the last price encountered by the seller is x and thus, she
could obtain the maximum gain by adjusting her price upwards to p∗(ci). Let σ′ be
the new state after this seller increases her price to p∗(ci), ceteris paribus. Since the
seller gains an amount greater than (x−ci)
2
8y
from this adjustment, the weight of the
edge from σ to σ′ in the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph is less than
8y
(x−ci)2 <
1
γ
. Now, consider any weighted cycle containing this outgoing edge. There
must be an edge in this cycle such that our seller decreases her price from some
p˜ > p to some p¯ ≤ p. However, the maximum gain of the seller in this transition
is less than (x−ci)
2
8y
since p¯ < pˆ(ci). Hence, the weight of this edge in the weighted
cycle is greater than the weight of the edge from σ to σ′. Therefore, σ passes the
weighted cycle test. On the other hand, if p > p+(ci) + δ, then the maximum gain
from adjusting her price downwards is greater than (x−ci)
2
8y
(e.g., when she switches
from zero market share at price p to full market share at price p+(ci)). Now if there
is a seller j who posts a price pj such that p ≥ pj > p
+(ci) – existence is shown in
the proof –, then there is a positive probability that these two sellers meet and seller
i obtains a zero market share. Then seller i can obtain a gain greater than (x−ci)
2
8y
by adjusting her price downwards to p+(ci). Let σ
′ be the new state after this seller
decreases her price to p+(ci), ceteris paribus. The weight of the edge from σ to σ
′
in the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph is less than 8y
(x−ci)2 <
1
γ
. Now,
consider any weighted cycle containing this outgoing edge. There must be an edge
in this cycle such that our seller changes her price from p+(ci) to some p˜ 
= p
+(ci).
Thus either p > p+(ci) or p < pˆ(ci). Hence, irrespective of the value of p, the
maximum gain of the seller is less than (x−ci)
2
8y
. Therefore, the weight of this edge in
the weighted cycle is greater than the weight of the edge from σ to σ′ and hence, σ
passes the weighted cycle test.
Like in the ﬁrst-price auction, the stochastically stable prices in Bertrand compe-
tition (approximately) satisfy a balance condition: at these prices, a seller’s maximum
gain from increasing her price equals her maximum gain from decreasing it.
Remark: In the one-shot Bertrand duopoly game under incomplete information
with the marginal costs for each seller continuously distributed on [0, x] (e.g., see
Spulber (1995)), the strategy proﬁle in which each seller posts the price equal to
pˆ(ci) is a minimax-regret equilibrium. Hence, as in the ﬁrst-price auction model,
Proposition 4.13 predicts that if the sellers repeatedly face a random Bertrand com-
petition environment and they are very slow to adapt their prices, then in the long
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run, the distributions of prices in the populations of sellers will be a minimax-regret
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand
how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions
depend on whether players interact within a ﬁxed set (ﬁxed matching) or they are
randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run pre-
dictions are minimal sets that are closed under “the same or better reply” operations.
Under additional assumptions in each case, the prediction boils down to pure Nash
equilibrium play, pure ex-post equilibrium play or pure minimax regret equilibrium
play. These three paradigms exhibit nice robustness properties in the sense that
they are independent of beliefs about the exogenous uncertainty of type spaces. At
the very least, these predictions ought to be compared to the more standard one
given by Bayesian equilibria. One obvious next step for further research would be to
generalize these results for the case of interdependent values.
6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We ﬁrst argue that Aˆ is a CUSOBR set if and only
if whenever the dynamics MFM/G(q) reaches any state in Aˆ, it does not leave Aˆ.
Suppose Aˆ is such that whenever the dynamics reaches any state in Aˆ, it never
leaves Aˆ. We argue that RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ Aˆ for all (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ Aˆ. Pick
any (a′1, . . . , a
′
N) ∈ RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN). The argument is trivial if (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N) =
(a1, . . . , aN ). So suppose (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N) 
= (a1, . . . , aN). Let I be the set of players such
that a′i 
= ai. Then for all i ∈ I, action a
′
i is a better reply for valuation vi to a−i
than ai. There is a positive and independent probability that a player either does
not switch her action or switches her action if she has positive regret. Hence, starting
from state (a1, . . . , aN ), there is a positive probability that, for all i ∈ I, the player of
valuation vi switches her action to a
′
i while for all j /∈ I, the player of valuation vj does
not switch her action. Hence, the dynamics moves from (a1, . . . , aN) to (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
N)
in one period with a positive probability. Therefore, (a′1, . . . , a
′
N) ∈ Aˆ. Hence, Aˆ is a
CUSOBR set. Next, suppose Aˆ is a CUSOBR set. Then for all (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ Aˆ, we
have RG(v1,...,vN )(a1, . . . , aN) ⊆ Aˆ. Since a player switches her action with a positive
probability only if she has positive regret, this means that once the dynamics reaches
28
a state in Aˆ, it never leaves Aˆ. It follows that Aˆ is a recurrent class if and only if it
is a minimal CUSOBR set.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: If (a1, . . . , aN ) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game, then
clearly {(a1, . . . , aN)} is a minimal CUSOBR set. Now, pick any a
1 = (a11, . . . , a
1
N)
that is not a pure Nash equilibrium of the game and suppose a1 is an element of
some minimal CUSOBR set Aˆ. Since G(v1, . . . , vN) is weakly acyclic under better
replies, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium aL and a better-reply path a1, . . . , aL
such that for any al, al+1 in the path, al+1 ∈ RG(v1,...,vN )(a
l). Since a1 ∈ Aˆ, it must
also be that aL ∈ Aˆ. But {aL} is a minimal CUSOBR set, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3.5: Suppose a1 = (a11, . . . , a
1
N ) is not a pure Nash equilibrium of
the one-shot second-price auction in which the valuations {v1, . . . , vN} of the players
are common knowledge. Then there exists bidder i(1) who could gain by unilaterally
deviating. Since bidding equal to one’s valuation is a weakly dominant strategy,
unilaterally deviating to bidding vi(1) is a better reply to a
1
−i(1) for bidder i(1). Let
a2 be the bid proﬁle such that bidder i(1) bids equal to her valuation and all other
bidders j 
= i(1) continue to bid a2j = a
1
j . If a
2 is a pure Nash equilibrium of the
game, then we are done. Otherwise, there exists a bidder i(2) 
= i(1) who could gain
by unilaterally deviating when the bid proﬁle is a2 (bidder i(1) cannot gain a positive
amount by unilateral deviation since she is playing her weakly dominant strategy).
Again, have i(2) bid truthfully and repeat the process. Since all bidders bidding
truthfully is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game, it should be clear that in a ﬁnite
number of steps, we will reach a bid proﬁle aL that is a pure Nash equilibrium of the
game. Thus, the game is weakly acyclic under better replies.
Proof of Lemma 3.7: Suppose a1 = (a11, . . . , a
1
N) is not a pure Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot ﬁrst-price auction in which the valuations {v1, . . . , vN} are common
knowledge. Then there exists a bidder i(1) who could gain by unilaterally deviating.
If bidder i(1) is getting a negative expected payoﬀ at a1, let a2i(1) = 0, which, with no
other change to a1, leads to a2. If a2 is a Nash equilibrium, we are done, and if not,
ﬁrst make the same change in the bids of those players who are receiving a negative
expected payoﬀ. Suppose that, after such changes, the bid proﬁle is al. At al all
bidders are receiving non-negative payoﬀs. If al is a Nash equilibrium, we are done. If
not, bidder i(l) has a proﬁtable deviation, and there are only two possibilities: either
she could gain by increasing her bid or decreasing her bid. To gain by increasing her
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bid, she must weakly outbid the highest bid, while to gain from decreasing her bid,
either she must reduce her loss or increase her proﬁt.
First, suppose bidder i(l) could gain by increasing her bid. Let al∗ be the highest
bid in the bid proﬁle al. Thus, bidder i(l) can weakly outbid the highest bid al∗ and
make a positive proﬁt. Then, in particular, bidding either al∗ or al∗+δ is a best reply
to al−i(l) for bidder i(l). Let a
l+1 be the bid proﬁle such that bidder i(l) bids such a
best reply to al−i(l), and all other bidders j 
= i(l) continue to bid a
l+1
j = a
l
j . Note that
the result of this is that the price in the auction is at least as high as before. If al+1
is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game, then we are done. Otherwise, there exists a
bidder i(l + 1) 
= i(l) who could gain by unilaterally deviating when the bid proﬁle
is al+1. This means that bidder i(l + 1) would like to weakly outbid the highest bid
a(l+1)∗ in the bid proﬁle al+1. Let al+2i(l+1) be a best reply to a
l+1
−i(l+1), which leads to
proﬁle al+2. Note that, again, the price in the auction when the proﬁle al+2 is used
is at least as high as the previous price. Again, either al+2 is a Nash equilibrium and
we are done, or it is not. But then, repeating the same argument a ﬁnite number of
times, this process, based on a non-decreasing price sequence, must end at a Nash
equilibrium.
Second, suppose bidder i(l) can gain by decreasing her bid, and recall once again
that all bidders are receiving non-negative expected payoﬀs. If at al, player i(l) can
proﬁtably deviate by decreasing her bid, noting that her expected payoﬀ is non-
negative, she must be winning the auction but she can still win at a lower price.
Thus, it must be that al∗−i(l) < a
l
i(l) ≤ vi(l), where a
l∗
−i(l) is the highest bid among
the bids al−i(l). Let a
l+1
i(l) ≥ a
l∗
−i(l) be a best reply to a
l
−i(l), thus deﬁning a
l+1. Now,
either al+1 is a Nash equilibrium and we are done, or not. If not, it must be that one
of the other bidders (j 
= i(l)) has a proﬁtable deviation. If this deviation consists
of increasing her bid, then we are back in the ﬁrst case. So suppose that in al+1,
no bidder has an improving deviation that consists of increasing her bid. Thus, for
bidder j 
= i(l), the improving deviation consists of decreasing her bid. Since bidder
i(l) bids the highest in al+1, it must be that al+1j = a
l+1
i(l) and bidder j obtains a
negative expected payoﬀ in al+1. For any such j, bidding al+2j = a
l+1
i(l) − δ is a better
reply than al+1j . In this way, change the bid of any such bidder j to obtain the proﬁle
al+2. The highest (but not necessarily unique) bidder in al+2 is i(l) and she does
not have an improving deviation in al+2 (in particular, she cannot gain by reducing
her bid to al+2i(l) − δ because such a deviation at best ties her at the bid of a
l+2
i(l) − δ).
Clearly, none of the bidders who switched between al+1 and al+2 have an improving
deviation. Finally, the rest of the bidders did not want to change their bid when the
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highest opposing bid was al+1i(l) = a
l+2
i(l) and so, they also do not have an improving
deviation. Hence, al+2 is a Nash equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 3.9: This proof and subsequent ones for Bertrand duopoly are
quite close to those for the ﬁrst-price auctions, and hence we omit them (available
upon request).
Proof of Lemma 4.3: It is easy to see that if (σ1, . . . , σN ) is a pure ex-post
equilibrium, then it must be that RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN) = {(σ1, . . . , σN)}. Now, sup-
pose (σ1, . . . , σN) is not a pure ex-post equilibrium. Then it must be that there
exists a i ∈ N , (vi, v−i) ∈ V , (ai, a−i) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σj(vj)) and a
′
i ∈ Ai such that
πi(vi, a
′
i, a−i) > πi(vi, ai, a−i). Deﬁne σ
′
i as follows: for all v
′
i 
= vi, let σ
′
i(v
′
i) = σi(v
′
i)
and
σ′i(vi, a
′′
i ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
σi(vi, a
′′
i ) +
1
|Pvi |
, if a′′i = a
′
i
σi(vi, a
′′
i )−
1
|Pvi |
, if a′′i = ai
σi(vi, a
′′
i ), otherwise.
Then (σ′i, σ−i) ∈ RG(RM)(σi, σ−i).
Proof of Proposition 4.4: We ﬁrst argue that Σˆ is a CUSOAEBR set if and
only if whenever the dynamics MRM/G(q) reaches any state in Σˆ, it does not leave
Σˆ. Suppose Σˆ is such that whenever the dynamics reaches any state in Σˆ, it never
leaves Σˆ. We argue that RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN) ⊆ Σˆ, ∀(σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ Σˆ. Pick any
(σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) ∈ RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN ). If (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N ) = (σ1, . . . , σN), then the argu-
ment is trivial. So suppose (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) 
= (σ1, . . . , σN ) and let I be the set of
positions i such that σ′i 
= σi. We know that (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N) ∈
∏
i∈N Σi(σi) and that
there exist (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ V and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai(σi(vi)) such that for all
i ∈ I, we have vi = v
(σi,σ′i)
i , ai = a
(σi,σ′i)
i and
πi(v
(σi,σ′i)
i , a
′
i
(σi,σ′i), a−i) > πi(v
(σi,σ′i)
i , a
(σi,σ′i)
i , a−i).
In state (σ1, . . . , σN), there is a positive probability that the valuation proﬁle of the
randomly matched players is (v1, . . . , vN ) and these players play the action proﬁle
(a1, . . . , aN ) since (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai(σi(vi)). There is a positive and indepen-
dent probability that a player either does not switch her action or switches her action
if she has positive regret. Hence, there is a positive probability that, for all i ∈ I,
the player of valuation vi switches to a
′
i
(σi,σ′i) while for all j /∈ I, the player of valua-
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tion vj continues to play aj . Furthermore, there is no change in the distributions of
actions in all other populations because none of the players from these populations
is matched. Hence, there is a positive probability that for all i ∈ I, the distributions
of actions in population Pi in the next period will be σ
′
i while for all j /∈ I, the
distributions of actions in population Pj in the next period will remain σj . Thus, the
dynamics will move from (σ1, . . . , σN) to (σ
′
1, . . . , σ
′
N ) in one period with a positive
probability. Therefore, it must be that (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N ) ∈ Σˆ. Hence, Σˆ is a CUSOAEBR
set. Next, suppose Σˆ is a CUSOAEBR set. Then for all (σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ Σˆ, we have
RG(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN ) ⊆ Σˆ. A player switches her action with a positive probability
only if she has positive regret and at most a single player in any population Pi
switches her action in one period (since only one such player is matched). Hence,
once the dynamics reaches a state in Σˆ, it never leaves Σˆ. It follows that Σˆ is a
recurrent class if and only if it is a minimal CUSOAEBR set.
Proof of Lemma 4.5: If (σ1, . . . , σN) is any pure ex-post equilibrium of the
game, then clearly {(σ1, . . . , σN )} is a minimal CUSOAEBR set. Now, pick any
σ1 = (σ11 , . . . , σ
1
N ) that is not a pure ex-post equilibrium of the game and suppose
σ1 is an element of some minimal CUSOBR set Σˆ. Since G(RM) is weakly acyclic
under adjacent-ex-post-better replies, there exists a pure ex-post equilibrium σL and
an adjacent-ex-post-better-reply path σ1, . . . , σL such that for any σl, σl+1 in the
path, σl+1 ∈ RG(RM)(σ
l). Since σ1 ∈ Σˆ, it must also be that σL ∈ Σˆ. But {σL} is a
minimal CUSOAEBR set, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4.7: Suppose σ1 = (σ11, . . . , σ
1
N) is not a pure ex-post equilibrium
of SPA(RM). Then there exists a i ∈ N , an ex-post realization of types, (vi, v−i),
and action proﬁle, (ai, a−i) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σ
1
j (vj)), such that bidder i could gain by
unilaterally deviating in this ex-post event. Since bidding equal to one’s valuation
is a weakly dominant strategy, it must be that ai 
= vi. Moreover, unilaterally de-
viating to bidding vi is a better reply for bidder i in this ex-post event. Let σ
2 be
the strategy proﬁle such that σ2j = σ
1
j for all j 
= i and σ
2
i is adjacent to σ
1
i with
σ2i (vi, ai) < σ
1
i (vi, ai) and σ
2
i (vi, vi) > σ
1
i (vi, vi). If σ
2 is a pure ex-post equilibrium
of the game, then we are done. Otherwise, repeat the above argument. Since the
strategy proﬁle in which all types of all bidders only bid truthfully is a pure ex-post
equilibrium of the game, it should be clear that in a ﬁnite number of steps, we will
reach a strategy proﬁle σL that is a pure ex-post equilibrium of the game. Thus, the
game is weakly acyclic under adjacent-ex-post-better replies.
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Proof of Proposition 4.9: Before we prove this proposition, let’s deﬁne the resis-
tance r(σ, σ′) of going from state σ to state σ′ when the probability of moving from
σ to σ′ in one period is zero under the Markov process MRM/G(q, α). Consider all
paths σ1, . . . , σL from σ = σ1 to σ′ = σL such that there is a positive probability of
moving from each σl to σl+1 in one period. Then r(σ, σ′) is the lowest total resistance
over all such paths, and the path with the lowest total resistance is called the path
of least resistance from σ to σ′.
The following lemma will be used in the proof.
Lemma 6.1. Suppose there is a positive probability of moving from σ to σ′ in one
period under the Markov process MRM/G(q, α). If σ
′ /∈ RG(RM)(σ), then r(σ, σ′) ≥ 1γ .
Proof : Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) and σ
′ = (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N). Since there is a positive proba-
bility of moving from σ to σ′ in one period, it must be that σ′i ∈ Σi(σi), ∀i (there is a
single match in every period). However, σ′ /∈ RG(RM)(σ). Then let I = {i|σi 
= σ′i}.
It follows that for all (v1, . . . , vN) ∈ V and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai(σi(vi)) with
vi = v
(σi,σ′i)
i and ai = a
(σi,σ′i)
i for all i ∈ I, there exists a j ∈ I such that
πj(v
(σj ,σ′j)
j , a
′
j
(σj ,σ′j), a−j) ≤ πj(v
(σj ,σ′j)
j , a
(σj ,σ′j)
j , a−j).
Hence, in every possible match, there exists a player who switches her action without
ex-post regret. Therefore, r(σ, σ′) ≥ 1
γ
.
Let σ, σ′ be the outgoing edge described. By construction, σ′ ∈ RG(RM)(σ).
Consider an σ-rooted tree with the lowest total resistance. Add the directed edge σ, σ′
to the σ-rooted tree. In the resulting graph, there exists a directed cycle σ1, . . . , σL
that starts and ends at σ. We argue that there exists a l with 2 ≤ l < L, such that
r(σl, σl+1) > r(σ, σ′). For all l such that 2 ≤ l < L, let σ[l]1, . . . , σ[l]Kl be the path
of least resistance from σl to σl+1.
• If there exists a l′, with 2 ≤ l′ < L, and k, with 1 ≤ k < Kl′ , such that
σ[l′]k+1 /∈ RG(RM)(σ[l′]k), then r(σ[l′]k, σ[l′]k+1) ≥ 1γ (using Lemma 6.1). Then,
r(σl
′
, σl
′+1) ≥ 1
γ
> r(σ, σ′).
• Next suppose that for all l such that 2 ≤ l < L and for all k such that
1 ≤ k < Kl, σ[l]
k+1 ∈ RG(RM)(σ[l]
k). This, in addition to the fact that
σ′ ∈ RG(RM)(σ), implies that there exists a weighted cycle in the weighted-
adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph that contains the edge σ, σ′. Hence, if σ
is such that there does not exist any weighted cycle containing the edge σ, σ′,
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then we have a contradiction and we are done. Otherwise, there exists an edge
on this weighted cycle whose weight is greater than the weight of the edge σ, σ′.
Hence, there must exist a l, with 2 ≤ l < L, such that r(σl, σl+1) > r(σ, σ′).
Now, delete the branch σl, σl+1 from the directed cycle σ1, . . . , σL to obtain an σl-
rooted tree with a lower total resistance than the stochastic potential of σ. Thus, σ
is not stochastically stable.
Proof of Lemma 4.10: Recall the deﬁnition of R˜G(RM) and accordingly deﬁne
R˜FPA(RM). Let σˆ = (σˆ1, . . . , σˆN) be such that σˆi(0, 0) = σˆi(δ, 0) = 1 and σˆi(vi, δ) =
1, ∀vi > δ. Pick any σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) and consider the iteration
R˜FPA(RM)({σ}) ⊆ R˜
2
FPA(RM)({σ}) ⊆ . . . ⊆ R˜
l
FPA(RM)({σ}) ⊆ . . .
We argue that there exists a lˆ such that σˆ ∈ R˜lˆFPA(RM)({σ}). Suppose σ is such
that there exists a 0 valuation type of some player who plays a positive bid with a
positive probability. Let z be the greatest positive bid played by any 0 valuation
type of any player. Without loss of generality, let player i be such that σi(0, z) > 0.
Let σ1i ∈ Σi(σi) be such that σ
1
i (0, 0) > σi(0, 0) and σ
1
i (0, z) < σi(0, z). Then the
strategy proﬁle σ1 = (σ11, . . . , σ
1
N ) such that σ
1
j = σj , ∀j 
= i is in R˜FPA(RM)({σ}).
This is because in the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) such that vj = 0, ∀j ∈ N and
(a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σj(0)) such that ai = z, player i obtains a negative expected
payoﬀ and hence, the bid of 0 is a better reply to a−i. If σ1 is such that there exists a
0 valuation type of some player who plays a positive bid with a positive probability,
then repeat this argument until we reach a σl such that all 0 valuation types of all
players surely bid 0. By construction, σl ∈ R˜lFPA(RM)({σ}). Suppose σ
l is such
that there exists a δ valuation type of some player who plays a positive bid with a
positive probability. Let z′ be the greatest positive bid played by any δ valuation
type of any player. Without loss of generality, let player i be such that σi(δ, z
′) >
0. Let σl+1i ∈ Σi(σ
l
i) be such that σ
l+1
i (δ, 0) > σ
l
i(δ, 0) and σ
l+1
i (δ, z
′) < σli(δ, z
′).
Then the strategy proﬁle σl+1 = (σl+11 , . . . , σ
l+1
N ) such that σ
l+1
j = σ
l
j , ∀j 
= i is in
R˜FPA(RM)({σ
l}) and hence, in R˜l+1FPA(RM)({σ}). This is because in the ex-post event
(v1, . . . , vN) such that vj = 0, ∀j 
= i and vi = δ, and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σ
l
j(vj))
such that aj = 0, ∀j 
= i and ai = z
′, player i obtains at most an expected payoﬀ of
0 and hence, the bid of 0 is a better reply to a−i. If σl+1 is such that there exists a
δ valuation type of some player who plays a positive bid with a positive probability,
then repeat this argument until we reach a σl
′
such that all 0 and δ valuation types
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of all players surely bid 0. By construction, σl
′
∈ R˜l
′
FPA(RM)({σ}). Suppose σ
l′ is
such that there exists a valuation type v′i > 2δ of player i who bids z
′′ 
= δ with
a positive probability. Let σl
′+1
i ∈ Σi(σ
l′
i ) be such that σ
l′+1
i (v
′
i, δ) > σ
l′
i (v
′
i, δ) and
σl
′+1
i (v
′
i, z
′′) < σl
′
i (v
′
i, z
′′). Then the strategy proﬁle σl
′+1 = (σl
′+1
1 , . . . , σ
l′+1
N ) such
that σl
′+1
j = σ
l′
j , ∀j 
= i is in R˜FPA(RM)({σ
l′}) and hence, in R˜l
′+1
FPA(RM)({σ}). This is
because in the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) such that vj = 0, ∀j 
= i and vi = v
′
i, and
(a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σ
l′
j (vj)) such that aj = 0, ∀j 
= i and ai = z
′′, the expected
payoﬀ of player i is either v′i/N if z
′′ = 0 or v′i − z
′′ if z′′ > δ and hence, in any
case, the bid of δ with the payoﬀ v′i − δ is a better reply to a−i. If σ
l′+1 is such
that there exists a valuation type v′j > 2δ of some player j who plays a bid other
than δ with a positive probability, then repeat this argument until we reach a σl
′′
such that all 0 and δ valuation types of all players surely bid 0 and all valuation
types of all players with valuations greater than 2δ surely bid δ. By construction,
σl
′′
∈ R˜l
′′
FPA(RM)({σ}). Suppose σ
l′′ is such that there exists a valuation type 2δ of
player i who plays a bid zˆ 
= δ with a positive probability. Let σl
′′+1
i ∈ Σi(σ
l′′
i ) be
such that σl
′′+1
i (2δ, δ) > σ
l′′
i (2δ, δ) and σ
l′′+1
i (2δ, zˆ) < σ
l′′
i (2δ, zˆ). Then the strategy
proﬁle σl
′′+1 = (σl
′′+1
1 , . . . , σ
l′′+1
N ) such that σ
l′′+1
j = σ
l′′
j , ∀j 
= i is in R˜FPA(RM)({σ
l′′})
and hence, in R˜l
′′+1
FPA(RM)({σ}). This is because in the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) such
that vj = 3δ, ∀j 
= i and vi = 2δ, and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σ
l′′
j (vj)) such that
aj = δ, ∀j 
= i and ai = zˆ, the payoﬀ of player i is at most 0 and hence, the bid of δ
is a better reply to a−i. If σl
′′+1 is such that there exists valuation type 2δ of some
player j who plays a bid other than δ with a positive probability, then repeat this
argument until we reach σˆ. By construction, σˆ ∈ R˜lˆFPA(RM)({σ}) for some lˆ.
It follows that any CUSOAEBR set must contain σˆ and hence, there exists a
unique minimal CUSOAEBR set.
Pick any player i of valuation v′i ∈ [3δ, 1] and ai ∈ [δ, v
′
i − 2δ]
⋂
Z. If v′i = 3δ,
then ai = δ and we already have σˆ ∈ Σˆ such that σˆi(3δ, δ) = 1. So pick v
′
i ∈ [4δ, 1].
Let σˆ1i ∈ Σi(σˆi) be such that σˆ
1
i (v
′
i, 2δ) > σˆi(v
′
i, 2δ) and σˆ
1
i (v
′
i, δ) < σˆi(v
′
i, δ). Then
the strategy proﬁle σˆ1 = (σˆ11, . . . , σˆ
1
N) such that σˆ
1
j = σˆj , ∀j 
= i is in R˜FPA(RM)({σˆ}).
This is because in the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) such that vj = 3δ, ∀j 
= i and vi = v
′
i,
and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σˆj(vj)) such that aj = δ, ∀j ∈ N , player i obtains an ex-
pected payoﬀ of (v′i−δ)/N and hence, the bid of 2δ with a payoﬀ of v
′
i−2δ is a better
reply to a−i. By repeating this argument we will reach a σˆl such that for all j ∈ N ,
σˆlj(vj , 0) = 1, ∀vj ∈ [0, δ], σˆ
l
j(vj , δ) = 1, ∀vj ∈ [2δ, 3δ] and σˆ
l
j(vj, 2δ) = 1, ∀vj ∈ [4δ, 1].
By construction, σˆl ∈ R˜lFPA(RM)({σˆ}). Now, pick v
′
i ∈ [5δ, 1]. Let σˆ
l+1
i ∈ Σi(σˆ
l
i) be
such that σˆl+1i (v
′
i, 3δ) > σˆ
l
i(v
′
i, 3δ) and σˆ
l+1
i (v
′
i, 2δ) < σˆ
l
i(v
′
i, 2δ). Then the strategy
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proﬁle σˆl+1 = (σˆl+11 , . . . , σˆ
l+1
N ) such that σˆ
l+1
j = σˆ
l
j , ∀j 
= i is in R˜FPA(RM)({σˆ
l}) and
hence, in R˜l+1FPA(RM)({σ}). This is because in the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) such
that vj = 4δ, ∀j 
= i and vi = v
′
i, and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σˆ
l
j(vj)) such that
aj = 2δ, ∀j ∈ N , player i obtains an expected payoﬀ of (v
′
i − 2δ)/N and hence,
the bid of 3δ with a payoﬀ of v′i − 3δ is a better reply to a−i. By repeating this
argument we will reach a σˆl
′
such that for all j ∈ N , σˆl
′
j (vj, 0) = 1, ∀vj ∈ [0, δ],
σˆl
′
j (vj , δ) = 1, ∀vj ∈ [2δ, 3δ], σˆ
l′
j (4δ, 2δ) = 1, and σˆ
l′
j (vj , 3δ) = 1, ∀vj ∈ [5δ, 1]. By
construction, σl
′
∈ R˜l
′
FPA(RM)({σˆ}). It should be clear that the statement in the
lemma can be proved after a ﬁnite number of repetitions of the above argument.
Proof of Proposition 4.11: We use the weighted cycle test to prove this proposi-
tion. However, we need to modify the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph
of FPA(RM) to incorporate the fact that in the event of a tie at the winning bid, the
ex-post payoﬀ of a bidder need not equal her expected payoﬀ (where the expectation
is with respect to the tie-breaking lottery). This is achieved by redeﬁning RFPA(RM)
as follows: (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) ∈ RFPA(RM)(σ1, . . . , σN) if and only if
1. (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) ∈
∏
i∈N Σi(σi) and
2. if (σ′1, . . . , σ
′
N) 
= (σ1, . . . , σN), then let I = {i|σi 
= σ
′
i}. There must exist
(v1, . . . , vN) ∈ V and (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai(σi(vi)) such that for all i ∈ I, we
have vi = v
(σi,σ′i)
i , ai = a
(σi,σ′i)
i and the expected payoﬀ of player i of valuation
v
(σi,σ
′
i)
i from bidding a
′
i
(σi,σ
′
i) against a−i is greater than her payoﬀ in some ex-
post event (i.e., after the realization of the tie-breaking lottery) following her
bid of ai
(σi,σ′i) against a−i.
Now, use this redeﬁned RFPA(RM) to modify the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-reply
graph of FPA(RM) by adding an edge from a strategy proﬁle σ to σ′ 
= σ if and
only if σ′ ∈ RFPA(RM)(σ). The weight of this edge is the resistance r(σ, σ′) (note
that we don’t have to modify the deﬁnition of the resistance since it was already
deﬁned with respect to ex-post regrets). The weighted cycle test is also valid for this
modiﬁed weighted-adjacent-ex-post-reply graph of FPA(RM).
We prove by induction that a state σ is stochastically stable only if ∀n = 0, . . . , 1
δ
,
the support of σi(nδ), Ai(σi(nδ)) ⊆
[
(n−1)δ
2
, (n+1)δ
2
]⋂
Z, ∀i ∈ N .
First, we show that the statement is true for n = 0. Consider any state σ such
that there exists a bidder of 0 valuation who plays a positive bid. Let z be the
greatest positive bid played by any 0 valuation type of any bidder. Without loss
of generality, let position i be such that σi(0, z) > 0. Let σ
1
i ∈ Σi(σi) be such that
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σ1i (0, 0) > σi(0, 0) and σ
1
i (0, z) < σi(0, z). Then the strategy proﬁle σ
1 = (σ11 , . . . , σ
1
N)
such that σ1j = σj , ∀j 
= i is in RFPA(RM)({σ}). This is because in the ex-post event
(v1, . . . , vN) such that vj = 0, ∀j ∈ N and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σj(0)) such that
ai = z, bidder i obtains a negative payoﬀ and hence, the bid of 0 is a better reply to
a−i. Hence, r(σ, σ1) < 1γ since only a single bidder of valuation 0 in population Pi
switches from a positive bid to a bid of 0 and there exists an ex-post event in state
σ in which this bidder has positive regret from bidding her positive bid instead of 0.
Thus, in the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph, there exists an outgoing
edge from σ to σ1 with a weight of less than 1
γ
. Now, consider any weighted cycle
containing this outgoing edge. Since σ1i (0, 0) > σi(0, 0), it must be that there exist
two states σl, σl+1 such that σl+1 ∈ RFPA(RM)(σ
l) and σl+1i (0, 0) < σ
l
i(0, 0). That
is, there exists a bidder of valuation 0 in population Pi who switches from bidding
0 to some positive bid. However, there does not exist any a−i such that bidder i
of valuation 0 would strictly prefer to bid some positive bid instead of 0. Hence,
r(σl, σl+1) ≥ 1
γ
. Thus, the state σ passes the wighted cycle test and hence, it is not
stochastically stable.
Now, suppose the statement is true for all n′ ≤ n. We argue that it is also true
for n + 1. Consider a state σ such that ∀j ∈ N and vj ≤ nδ, we have Aj(σj(vj)) ⊆[
vj−δ
2
,
vj+δ
2
]⋂
Z but there exists a bidder of valuation (n+1)δ in population Pi who
bids z /∈
[
nδ
2
, (n+2)δ
2
]⋂
Z.
First suppose z > (n+2)δ
2
. Let σ1i ∈ Σi(σi) be such that σ
1
i ((n + 1)δ, δ) > σi((n +
1)δ, δ) and σ1i ((n + 1)δ, z) < σi((n + 1)δ, z). Consider the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN)
such that vj = 0, ∀j 
= i and vi = (n + 1)δ, and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈
∏
j∈N Aj(σj(vj))
such that aj = 0, ∀j 
= i and ai = z. Then bidding δ is a better reply to a−i
than z and bidder i’s ex-post regret is z − δ. Hence, r(σ, σ1) ≤ 1
z−δ <
1
γ
since
only a single bidder of valuation (n + 1)δ in population Pi switches from the bid
of z to the bid of δ and there exists an ex-post event in state σ in which this
bidder has positive ex-post regret of z − δ from bidding z instead of δ. Thus, in the
weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph of FPA(RM), there exists an outgoing
edge from σ to σ1 with a weight of less than 1
γ
. Now, consider any weighted cycle
containing this outgoing edge. Since
∑
z′≥z σ
1
i ((n + 1)δ, z
′) <
∑
z′≥z σi((n + 1)δ, z
′),
it must be that there exist two states σl, σl+1 such that σl+1 ∈ RFPA(RM)(σ
l) and∑
z′≥z σ
l+1
i ((n + 1)δ, z
′) >
∑
z′≥z σ
l
i((n + 1)δ, z
′). That is, there exists a bidder of
valuation (n+1)δ in population Pi who switches from bidding z˜ < z to some zˆ ≥ z.
However, the bidder i of valuation (n+1)δ can gain a positive amount from increasing
her bid from z˜ to zˆ against any a−i only if zˆ < (n+1)δ and the maximum such gain
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equals (n+1)δ−zˆ (when she turns from loosing at z˜ to winning at zˆ). Since zˆ > (n+2)δ
2
,
the maximum gain from such a switch is less than nδ
2
. Hence, r(σl, σl+1) > 2
nδ
> 1
z−δ
since z > (n+2)δ
2
. Thus, the state σ passes the wighted cycle test and hence, it is not
stochastically stable.
Finally, suppose z < nδ
2
. This is possible only if n ≥ 1. Let z∗ be the least
bid greater than or equal to nδ
2
. Let σ1i ∈ Σi(σi) be such that σ
1
i ((n + 1)δ, z
∗) >
σi((n + 1)δ, z
∗) and σ1i ((n + 1)δ, z) < σi((n + 1)δ, z).
Case 1 : n is odd. Then z ≤ (n−1)δ
2
and z∗ = (n+1)δ
2
. Pick a j 
= i and vj = (n−1)δ. By
the induction hypothesis, there exists a z′ ∈
[
(n−2)δ
2
, nδ
2
]⋂
Z such that σj(vj, z
′) > 0.
Then z′ = (n−1)δ
2
. Consider the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN) such that vk = 0, ∀k 
= i, j,
vj = (n − 1)δ and vi = (n + 1)δ, and (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
k∈N Ak(σk(vk)) such that
ak = 0, ∀k 
= i, j, aj = z
′ and ai = z. Since z ≤ z′, with a positive probability, bidder i
looses the auction. Therefore, in this ex-post stage, bidding z∗ is a better reply to a−i
than z and bidder i’s ex-post regret is (n+1)δ− z∗. Hence, r(σ, σ1) ≤ 1
(n+1)δ−z∗ <
1
γ
since only a single bidder of valuation (n + 1)δ in population Pi switches from the
bid of z to the bid of z∗ and there exists an ex-post event in state σ in which
this bidder has positive ex-post regret of (n + 1)δ − z∗ from bidding z instead of
z∗. Thus, in the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply graph of FPA(RM), there
exists an outgoing edge from σ to σ1 with a weight of less than 1
γ
. Now, consider any
weighted cycle containing this outgoing edge. Since σ1i ((n+1)δ, z
∗) > σi((n+1)δ, z∗),
it must be that there exist two states σl, σl+1 such that σl+1 ∈ RFPA(RM)(σ
l) and
σl+1i ((n+1)δ, z
∗) < σli((n+1)δ, z
∗). That is, there exists a bidder of valuation (n+1)δ
in population Pi who switches from bidding z
∗ to some zˆ 
= z∗. Suppose zˆ > z∗.
The bidder i of valuation (n + 1)δ can gain a positive amount from increasing her
bid from z∗ to zˆ against any a−i only if zˆ < (n + 1)δ and the maximum such gain
equals (n + 1)δ − zˆ < (n + 1)δ − z∗ (when she turns from loosing at z∗ to winning
at zˆ). Next, suppose zˆ < z∗. The bidder i of valuation (n + 1)δ can gain a positive
amount from decreasing her bid from z∗ to zˆ against any a−i only if zˆ > maxj =i aj
and the maximum such gain equals z∗− δ < (n+1)δ− z∗ (when turns from winning
at z∗ to winning at the bid of δ). Hence, r(σl, σl+1) > 1
(n+1)δ−z∗ ≥ r(σ, σ
1). Thus,
the state σ passes the wighted cycle test and so, it is not stochastically stable.
Case 2 : n is even. Then n ≥ 2, z ≤ (n−2)δ
2
and z∗ = nδ
2
. Pick a j 
= i and
vj = (n − 2)δ. By the induction hypothesis, there exists a z
′ ∈
[
(n−3)δ
2
, (n−1)δ
2
]⋂
Z
such that σj(vj , z
′) > 0. Then z′ = (n−2)δ
2
. Consider the ex-post event (v1, . . . , vN)
such that vk = 0, ∀k 
= i, j, vj = (n − 2)δ and vi = (n + 1)δ, and (a1, . . . , aN) ∈∏
k∈N Ak(σk(vk)) such that ak = 0, ∀k 
= i, j, aj = z
′ and ai = z. Since z ≤ z′, with
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a positive probability, bidder i looses the auction. Therefore, in this ex-post stage,
bidding z∗ is a better reply to a−i than z and bidder i’s ex-post regret is (n+1)δ−z∗.
Hence, r(σ, σ1) ≤ 1
(n+1)δ−z∗ <
1
γ
. Thus, in the weighted-adjacent-ex-post-better-reply
graph of FPA(RM), there exists an outgoing edge from σ to σ1 with a weight of
less than 1
γ
. Like in case 1, we can easily argue that in any weighted cycle containing
this outgoing edge, there exists an edge with weight greater than r(σ, σ1). Hence, σ
is not stochastically stable.
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